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THE MULTI-OUTPUT TRANSLOG PRODUCTION COST FUNCTION: 
THE CASE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
M N. Darrough and J. M. Heineke* 
In this paper we study the relationship between costs, input 
prices and activity levels in a sample of approximately thirty 
medium sized city police departments for the years 1968, 69, 
71 and 73. Our interest lies in determining the functional 
structure of law enforcement production technology . 
Since efficient allocation o f resources to activities requires 
knowledge of relative incremental costs for the activities in-
volved, we are particularly interested in determining marginal 
cost functions for, and rates of transformation between the 
various outputs. Since past studies have adopted func tional 
specifications which have implicitly maintained strong hypo-
theses about the underlying technology, we adopt a quite 
general functional specification which permits testing the 
appropriateness of these hypotheses. In a more general context 
we model and estimate the structu re of production for a 
multiple o utput-multiple input firm in a manner which places 
few restrictions on first and second order parameters of the 
underlying structure. 
INTRODUCTION 
One question which arises immediately in any discussion of 
cost or production functions associated wi th law enforcement 
agencies concerns the appropriate measure of "output." 
Clearly police departments produce multiple o utputs (services) 
for a community, ranging fro m directing traffic, quieting 
family squabbles, and providing emergency first aid, to pre-
*Professor Reineke's participation in this study was supported 
by U.S. Department of Justice Grant # 75-Nl-99-01 23 to the 
Hoover Institut ion at Stanford University. We have benefited 
from discussions with M. K . Block, L. J. Lau and F. C. Nold. 
venting crimes and solving existing crimes. In this study we 
view police output as being of essentially two types: (1) 
general service activities as epitomized by the traffic control 
and emergency first aid care functions of police departments; 
and (2) activities directed to solving existing crimes. Strictly 
speaking, "solving existing crimes" is an intermediate output 
with deterrence or prevention of criminal activity being the 
final product. But due to the difficulty of measuring crime 
prevention we use the number of "solutions" by type of crime 
as output measures. I 
In the past few years a number of authors have, to one 
degree or another, addressed the problem of determining the 
structure of production in law enforcement agencies. Since 
under certain rather mild regularity conditions there exists a 
duality between cost and production functions, either the cost 
function or the production function may be used to character· 
ize the technological structure of a firm. The studies of Chap· 
man,Hirsch and Sonenblum (1975), Ehrlich (1973, 1975) , and 
Wilson and Boland (1977) all proceed by estimating produc-
tion functions while Popp and Sebold (1972) and Walzer (1972) 
estimate cost functions. It is of some interest to briefly review 
the findings of these authors. 
Chapman, Hirsch and Sonenblum estimate a rather tradi-
tional production function, at least from a theoretical point 
of view. All police outputs are collapsed in to one aggregate, 
which is then regressed on input use levels utilizing data from 
the city of Los Angeles for the years 1956-70. They find 
strongly increasing returns to scale-often a two to four percent 
output response to a one percent change in input usage. 
I see Chapman, Hirsch and Sonenblum ( 1975) fo r an attempt to measure 
cr ime preven tion as an o utput of po lice agencies. 
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Ehrlich also uses an aggregate solution rate as the output 
measure, but ins tead of employing trad itional input measures 
he regresses the aggregate solution rate on per capita expendi-
tures on police, the aggregate offense rate and a series o f exo-
genous ("environmen tal") variables. The expenditure variable 
is, of course, an index of overall input use levels while the 
aggregate offense ra te is included to measure the effects of 
"crowding" or capacity constrain ts on ou tput. This is a sub-
stantial depar ture fro m a neoclassical approach in wh ich the 
shape of the production funct ion itself will reflect diminishing 
returns as capacity is pressed. But it is a specification that has 
been widely adopted by th ose who have followed Ehrlich. 
(For example, see Vandaele (1975) or Voley and Phillips 
(1972). Using per capita expenditures to measure the scale of 
output, Ehrlich finds that a one percent increase in expendi-
tures per cap ita leads to much less than a one percent increase 
in the solution rate. 
Votey and Phillips estimate production functions which 
link solution rates for the properly crimes of auto theft, 
burglary, larceny and robbery to input usage. As with Ehrlich 
and Vandaele, the authors include the level of offenses as an 
argument in the production function along with more tradi-
tional input measures. 
The Wilson a nd Bo land study is similar to the work of 
Votey and Phil lips in that they study the production of solu-
tions to several properly cr imes. But instead of input levels as 
determinants of solutions, they utilize the ever present "capa-
city" variable and variab les meant to account for productivity 
differences between departments. Here as with Vandaele and 
Votey and Philips, the authors cannot address the question of 
scale economies due to the fac t that only a subset of all out-
puts are includ ed in these studies, 
Finally, both Po pp and Sebold, and Walzer estimate cost 
fun ctions and attempt to measure sca le economies. The former 
use population size in the pol ice jurisdiction as their measure of 
" scale" along with a large number of demographic and e nviron-
mental variables to estimate the per capita costs of po lice 
service. Given the appropria teness of these variables for ex-
plaining costs, the authors find diseconomies of scale through-
out the en tire range of population sizes. Of course the popu-
lation variable provides a considerably different concept of scale 
than economists are accustomed to considering, an d in fact , 
Walzer has argued that population size is a poor measure of 
scale for several reasons-the most important being a te ndency 
on the part of police administrators to determine manpower 
needs as a proportion of population size. In such a case there 
is obviously a strong bias toward constant re turns to scale. 
In his study Walzer recognizes that offenses cleared, accidents 
investigated, etc., all make up the outpu t of a police depart-
ment. But instead of estimating a multiple output cost func-
tion, he creates an "index of police service" by collapsing all 
outputs into one.2 Once again the estima ted cost func tion 
contains a capacity measure (the offense rate), in add it ion to 
measure of input prices, input usage and several variables meant 
to pick up externally determined differences in productivity . 
2The weights used are average times spent on each type of act ivit y. 
-
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Using the service index to measure output Walzer finds evi-
dence of economies of scale , although they seem to be rather 
sligh t. Interes tingly enough he also finds that input costs are 
not significantly related to overall production costs. 
OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
A number of strong hypotheses concerning U1e production 
structure of law enforcement agencies have been implicitly 
maintained in the studies we have ske tched. First, the argu-
ments entering cost and production functions have for the 
most part differed considerably from what one would expect 
from classical production theory. In addit ion, in the one case 
where input costs do enter the cost function (Walzer), linear 
homogeneity in input costs has not been imposed on the 
estimated cos t function . One possible explanation for these 
deviations from classical production and cost specifications is 
U1at classical theory , and cost minimizing behavior in particu-
lar, is not capable of explaining observed choices in public 
agencies. While tllis is a plausib le hy pothesis, it should be 
tested rather than maintained) 
Second, each of the estimated production fun ctio n s 
upon which we have reported is either linear or linear logarith-
mic. Such functions may be viewed as first order approximations 
to an arbitrary production function. It is well known tha t fi rst 
order approximations severely restrict admissable patterns of 
substitution among inputs and admissable rates of transforma-
tion among o utputs as well as having other undesirable empiri-
cal implications.4 An addition al problem with linear logarith-
mic production or cost functions arises if one is interested in 
determining the extent of scale econo mies, since these func-
tions do not permit scale economies to vary with output. On 
a related point, we noted above that each of the production 
studies su rveyed included a " capacity" measure as an argu-
ment. A possible explanation for this inclusion might be 
based upon the restrictiveness of the chosen functional forms 
and a consequent attempt on the part of the au thors to pro-
vide output responses wllich do vary with the scale of opera-
tion, in functions which do not naturally possess th is property. 
For these reasons and o thers we adopt a second order approxi-
mation to the underly ing cost and production structure thereby 
leaving the various elasticity measures of common interest free 
to be dete rmined by t he data.S 
Third , since the Chapman, Hirsch and Sonenblum, Walzer 
and Ehrlich studies all utilize single output aggregates they 
implicitly maintain the existence of an ind ex over all police 
outputs which allows outputs to be consistently aggregated 
into a single measure. l n what follows we estimate a multiple 
output cost function and test whe ther the various subsets of 
outputs may be consistently aggregated into single ca tegories. 
3Th is hypothesis is ex plicit in Wilson and B<:>land , p. 8, who s tate, " In our 
view, police departments do not behave in accordance w ith the e co nom-
ic mod el of the firm. " 
4For exa mple, lin ear logarithmic production functions imply input ex· 
pend iture shares which are independent o f the level of ex penditure, while 
linear production fu nctions imp ly perfect in put substitutabilit y and con · 
sequcntly ru le out internal solutions to the cost minimizatio n prob lem. 
S(n th e Popp and Sebold , and Walzer st ud ies the production cost func tion 
is specified to be q uadratic in the scale argument alt hough all o ther second 
order parameters are restricted to be zero. 
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Fourth, the Wilson and Bolan d, Votey and Phillips and 
Vandaele studies each implicitly maintain the hypothesis of 
nonjoint outputs by estimating separate production functions 
for different types of solutions. Again, instead of maintaining 
this hypothesis we estimate a multiple output function and 
then test the nonjointness hypothesis. 
To summarize, in this study we characterize the structure 
of production in a combined cross section and time series 
analysis of U.S. police departments in a sufficiently general 
manner to permit testing of each of the major maintained 
hypotheses in past studies. This amounts, primarily, to testing 
for existence of consistent aggregate indices of police output, 
for nonjointness of output, and for consistency of our estimated 
equations with the optimizing behavior of classical theory. 
In addition, we calculate (1) marginal cost functi.ons for solu-
tions to the property crimes of burglary, robbery, larceny 
and motor vehicle theft, and for solutions to crimes against the 
person; (2) marginal rates of transformation between these 
activities; and (3) an estimate of scale economies based upon 
the response of total cost to a simultaneous variation in all 
police outputs. In the next two sections we provide definitions, 
theorems and the conceptual structure which underpin the 
parameter estimation and testing which follow. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The following definitions and theorems provide precise 
meaning to many of the concepts discussed above and the 
basis for testing the maintained hypotheses of earlier studies. 
Let F (y, v) = 0 represent the production possibility front ier, 
where y is an n vector of outputs and v is an m vector of in-
puts, and C (y, w) the associated production cost function, 
where w is an m vector of input prices. 
T11eorem 1: C (y, w) =min wTv 
veL (y) 
where L (y) = { v IF (y, v) ~ 0 } is the input requirement set and 
T denotes transposition. The function C (y, w) is unique and is 
a positive linear homogeneous, differentiable and nonincreasing 
function of input prices, w. (See Uzawa (1964) or Shephard 
(J 970).) 
Wedenote thesetsofn outputs and m inputs as N= {1, 2, 3, 
... , n} and M = { I , 2, . . . , m} and partition these sets into p and 
o mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets, respectively, N = 
{N 1, N2, ... , Np } and M = { M1, M2, ... , M0 .}The elements of 
Ni are denoted Yi, the elements of~· Vj . 
Definition 1: lf marginal rates of transformation between any 
two outputs from the subset Nk are independent of all other out-
puts, not in Nk then the production function is separable (weak-
ly) with respect to the partition { Nk, N2, \LQ * k}. A similar de-
finition holds for input partitions. Formally, the production func-
tion F (y, v) = 0 is output separable with respect to the partition 
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and is input separable with respect to the partition { M , M Vs 
r s• 
* r} iff 
Theorem 2: Separability with respect to the output partition 
{ N1, N2, .. . , Np} and the input partition { M 1, M2, . .. , M0 } is 
necessary and sufficient for the production function to be writ-
ten asF(y, v)= F* (h 1 (Y 1), ... , hp (YP)' gl (V 1 ) , ... , g0 (V 0 )) 
where hi and gj are called category functions and are functions of 
the elements ofNi and Mj only .(See Goldman and Uzawa (1964).) 
Definition 2: A technology with production function F (y, v) is 
nonjoint if there exists functions f1 (v), f2 (v), .. . , fn(v) with 
the property that fi (v) is independent ofyj, i * j . 
So to show that a technology is nonjoint, the functions fi 0 
must exist and be free of any economies or diseconomies of joint-
ness. As Hall (1973) has pointed out, this does not require 
physically separate processes producing the various outputs, nor 
does the fact that two or more outputs are produced in the same 
plant rule out nonjointness. 
Theorem 3: A technology is nonjoint iff the joint cost function 
can be written as C (y, w) = c1 (y 1, w) + c2 (y2, w) + ... +C11 
(y11' w). (See Hall (1973).) 
Definition 3: Aggregation is said to be consistent if the solutions 
to a problem at hand are identical regardless of whether one uses 
aggregate indices or the micro level variables. 
Definition 4: If a function is separable and each of the category 
functions is homothetic, the function is said to be homothetical-
ly separable. 
Theorem 4: Homothetic separability is sufficient for consistent 
aggregation.lf a function is separable, homo the tic separability is 
necessary for consistent aggregation. (See Blackerby, Primont & 
Russell (1977).) 
MOTIVATION OF AGENCIES 
We next present two alternative models of the decision process 
oflawenforcement agencies. One model focuses on input decis· 
ions, the other on output decisions. It should be kept in mind 
that the model chosen to represent agency behavior will likely 
have a major influence on the va lues of estimated parameters. 
Hence one should consider the alternative specifications with one 
eye on stat istical tractability and data limitations, and the other 
on the "realism" of the implied decision process. 
> 
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Cost Minimization-The formal structure provided by the cost 
minimization behavioral hypothesis can be imposed on the 
estimation process in several ways. To begin , we generalize the 
traditional cost minimization paradigm to include the multiple 
output firm. ln particular, we assume that law enforcement 
a encies are given a vector of outputs which is minimally a~ceptable to the community and are instructed to provide at 
least that level of service at minimum cost. 6 Formally the 
agency's problem is to 
(s.t.) F(y0,v)=O 
where yO is the minimally acceptable output vector. Optimiza-
tion problem (3) provides the system 
(4) 
= 0, 
i, j = 1, 2, ... , m, i =F j 
of m+ 1 equations which may be used in estimating F. If equa-
tions (4) are assumed to be associated with a well behaved mini-
mum, we know that a solution for vas a function of wand yO 
exists. In addition, as long as input prices are exogenously 
determined as far as an individual agency is concerned, the 
solution yields the n endogenous factor demand as functions 
of strictly exogenous variables. Because factor demands are 
simultaneously determined, disturbances, given by the stoch-
astic specification into which the model must event ually be 
imbedded, will be correlated across equations. As a conse-
quence, it will usually be necessmy to treat the solution to 
(4) as a system for purposes of parameter estimation, if 
efficiency is a cri terion. 
Two other points concerning the system implied by 
equations ( 4) are of interest: First, if ( 4) can be solved for the 
V· as functions of w and yO, these functions may well be non-
' linear in the parameters. This need not be a major obstacle , 
but for large systems nonlinear estimation is expensive and 
one is never sure of estimability (convergence). Secondly, and 
more important, is the fact that although we know a solution 
to ( 4) exists in principle, this is cold comfort to the econometri-
cian charged with estimating F(-). Since for even modestly 
general functional specifications for F(·), it will generaiJy be 
impossible to express the vi as explicit functions of wand yO. 
An alternative to the approach we have just described for 
estimating the production structure is to focus on the cost 
function rather than the production function. Due to the 
duality between cost and production functions, once one 
function is given the other is uniquely determined) So it mat-
ters not a whit which fu nction is estimated, and the choice of 
estimating the cost function or the production function should 
be made on purely statistical grounds. 
6In a democratic society , voter s through their elected representatives pro-
vide this info rmation. 
7See Diewert (1 974). 
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One way of proceeding to estimate the production cost 
function would be to use OLS to directly estimate C (y, w). 
Since both w and y are exogenous in the present framework, 
OLS is an appropriate procedure. In con trast to the system we 
have just discussed this is a welcome respite. But a caveat 
must be added: lf C (y, w) is estimated via OLS then one ends 
up not exploiting the information available in the maintained 
hypothesis or cost minimization , which might have been used to 
add precision to parameter eslimates.8 Furthermore, unless 
there is significant variation in y and w across the sample, 
multicollinearity could be a problem. (One might expect 
this problem to crop up especially with input prices.) An 
additional advantage of imposing the structure implied by 
cost minimization is that the resulting restrictions across para-
meters will help circumvent multicollinearity problems which 
may be present. 
The economical way to add the structure implied by cost 
minimization is to call upon Shephards' Lemma (1953) which 
gives cost minimizing factor demands as a function o f the 
partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to input 
prices: 
(5) v. = ac;aw. 1 1 i = 1, 2, ... , m. 
ln general, estimation of (5) will no t be sufficient to deter-
mine all of the parameters of the production cost function.9 
This can be remedied merely by including CO as an equation 
in the system to be estin1ated . ln which case 
(6) v. = ac;aw. 
1 I ' 
i = 1, 2, .. . , m 
C = C (y, w). 
lt is important to keep in mind that a maintained hypothesis 
of this section has been that law enforcement agencies are 
assigned minimal output requirements and that input prices 
are exogenous as far as any single agency is concerned. As 
wi th the dual system (4) above, right hand variables in system 
(6) will be uncorrelated with stochas tic disturban ces in the 
econometric version of (6). Hence estimation of equations (6) 
will most assuredly identify the parameters of the cost function . 
But since the V· are simultaneously de termined, disturbances 
I 
will be correlated across equations as before, necessitating 
estimating (6) as a simultaneous system if efficient estimates are 
desired. 
An additional advatnage of estimating (6) instead of (4) 
stems from the fact that equations (6) will be lineaJ in the 
parameters for any polynomial approximation to an arbitrary 
cost function. 
Value Maximization-In this section we.provide an alternative 
framework within which the structure of law enforcement 
production technology could be estimated . The model is essen-
Bof cou rse this information was present in system (4) above. 
9For example if C (Y, w) is a polynomial in y and w, parameters associated 
with terms in elements of y alone will be missing from equation (5). 
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ially a value maximization model and of course still implies 
that input decisions are reached in a cost minimizing manner. 
The value maximization model has the advantage of not 
requiring that police decision makers take the community's 
final output vector as a datum. Indeed the focus of the model 
shifts from determination of optimal input usage given an 
output vector, to determination of the optimal mix of outputs. 
Using Pi to represent the value to the community of a 
solution to a crime of type i, P = (P1, P2, . .. , P11) , the 
police agency's decision problem is 
(7) max pTy - C (y, w) · 
y 
Decision problem (7) provides the familiar system 
i =I , 2, ... , n 
which may be used to estimate C (y, w). As was the case with 
equations (5) above, if C (y, w) is approximated with a poly-
nomial in y and w, equations (8) alone will not be sufficient to 
determine the cost function. This can be remedied by including 
C (y, w) itself in the system to be estimated. In which case 
(9) Pi - actoyi = o, 
C - C(y,w) = 0 
i = 1, 2, ... , n 
is the system of interest. Assuming that the values P and input 
costs are exogenously determined, equations (9) determine 
the n endogenous solution levels as functions of P and w.l 0 
One problem in implementing this system is an econometric 
context is obvious: The values to a community of the various 
types of solution are at best difficult to obtain. In the case of 
property crimes one might consider using average values stolen 
for each of the several types of property crimes to approximate 
the loss to society. Although this measure is far from perfect, 
it does provide a means for studying the mix of property 
crime solutions and is used in tllis capacity below.l1 But for 
the case of "crimes against lhe person," e.g., homicide, rape 
and assault, such a convenient proxy is not available. 
To circumvent this problem we assume that there exists 
functions C* and f such that the cost function can be written 
as 
(10) C = C* (f (y1, ... , Yp' w), Yp+l• ... , Yn, w) 
where y 1, ... , Yp represent solutions to crimes against property 
and Yp+ 1, ... , y n represent solutions to crimes against lhe 
person and the service activities performed by police. That is, 
we assume that solutions to crimes against property are func-
1 Oro genera l, the e lements of P are at least partially determined by the 
output mix chose n by police decision makers, e .g., increased solu tions for 
crime i will, ceteris paribus, lower ex peeled returns to crime and he nce 
Pi. 
1 I Average values sto len are an approximat ion to the direct financial loss 
suffered by society, on average, from an offense of type i. To the ex tent 
that so lving crimes has a deterrent effect , this measure will underestimate 
the value of a solution to offense i by the value of illega l transfers deterred 
per so lution. 
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tionally separable from all other police activities. As we indi. 
cated above, (Theorem 2) this is equivalent to requiring that 
marginal rates of transformation between solutions to all pairs 
of property crimes be invariant to the level of nonproperty 
crime solutions and to the level of other services provided, e.g., 
traffic control, emergency first aid, etc. In this case, optimiza. 
tion (7) may be treated as two problems: The optimal mix of 
property crime solutions, non property crime solutions and 
services is determined in a first step after which a second optimi-
zation is performed to determine the optimal mix of property 
crime solutions. See Strotz (1957). System (9) then becomes 
(11) Pi- ac*/ayi = o, i = 1, 2, ... , p 
C- C* (f (y1, y2, ... , Yp' w), Yp+1• ... , Yn' w) = 0 
and is estimated below for the case of four property crimes, 
burglary, robbery, motor vehicle theft and larceny ,an aggregate 
of crimes against the person and an aggregate service indicator. 
We have chosen to estimate the production cost function 
utilizing equations (11) rather than (6) for several reasons: 
First, costs in law enforcement agencies tend to be predomi-
nately labor costs (approximately ninety percent). And as one 
would expect, salaries of police employees by rank are highly 
correlated. Therefore, il will not be possible to include more 
than one, or at most two input demand equations if structure 
(6) is imposed. In addit ion, we approximate C* with a second 
order expansion in the logarithms of y and wand factor demand 
equations will impose no restrictions across the coefficien ts of 
lnyi and lnyi lnyj. If these terms are highly collinear, which is 
likely to be the case, then system (11) places restrictions across 
coefficients of terms in y and reduces the collinearity between 
the elements of y. The second reason for choosing (I I) as the 
basis for estimation is that it explicitly addresses the output 
mix problem rather than assuming that the decision is exo-
geneous to police administntors as in (6). 
THE TRANSLOG MODEL 
From an econometric point of view equation system (11) is 
only of limited interest until a specific functiona l form has 
been assigned to the cost function C* (y, w). The primary con-
cern in choosing a function form for C* is that the chosen 
class of functions be capable of approximating the unknown 
cost function to the desired degree of accuracy. ln widespread 
use in the literature in the past few years are the class of so 
called "flexible" functional forms which includes the generalized 
Leontief function, tl1e generalized Cobb-Douglas function, the 
transcendental logarithmic function and many hybrids.12 
These functions are all second order approximations to arbitrary 
differentiable, primal or dual objective functions and in particu-
lar place no restrictions on elasticities of substitution between 
inputs or elasticities of transformat ion between outputs and 
allow returns to scale to vary with the level of output. We have 
chosen to approximate C*(y, w) with a translog funct ion due 
primarily to the fact that most past studies of law enforce· 
I2see Diewert (1971, 1973, 1974) and Ch ristiansen, Jorgensen and Lau 
(197 1, 1973, 1975). 
-
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rnent agency production technology have adopted linear 
logarithmic production structures.l3 
The translog cost function may be written as 
n n1 n n 
(12) lnC (y, w) = a0 +~a- lny- + ~ b- 1nw- + J-2 ~ ~ ~-· 1ny- lny-l I I 1 I I I 1. 1J I J 
mm mn 
+ J-2 ~ ~ f3·· 1nw- I nw· + ~ ~1' .. Jny- 1nw-. 
1 I IJ I J I 1 IJ 1 J 
Since logar ithmic functions are continuously differentiable, 
the parameters ~ij and (3ij will be symmetric, i.e., ~ij = ~ji and 
(3·· = f3· i , Vi, j. Our maintained hypothesis of functional separa-b~tty, Jsee equation (lO),between property crime solutions and 
aU other activities of the police agency implies the following 
restrictions on equation (1 2): 
(1 3) ~ij = 0, i = 1, 2, . .. , p, j = p+ 1, p+2 , .. 14 ., 11 • 
The hypothesis of linear homogenity of the cost fun ction in 
factor prices, nonjointness of outputs and existence of consis-
ten t indices of outpu t discussed above are not main tained, but 
rather tested. 
Testing for linear homogenity of C (y, w) in inputs prices 
may be interpreted as a test for cost minimizing behavior and 
implies t he following restr ictions on the translog cost function : 
m m m m 
(14) ~b- = 1 ~f3·· = ~f3· · = ~r .. = o 
. 1 ' . 1) . 1) . 1J 
I J 1 1 
It will also be of interest to test for constant returns to scale 
in output. Constant re turns to scale implies 
n n n n 
(1 5) ~ai = 1, ~~ij = ~~ij =~rij = 0 
1 J I I 
lf outputs are nonjoint, all cross second order terms in y ar e 
zero, i.e., 
(16) ~- · = 0 lJ , i, j = 1 , 2, . . . , n, i -=!= j. 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In this section we specialize the n output, m input produc-
tion model to the model which is estimated and provide the 
stochastic specifica tion needed for estima tion. We had available 
13These s tudies have utilized linear logarithmic produc tion f un c tio n s 
which in turn imply Line ar logarith mic productio n cost functio ns. This 
property of linear logarithmic primal and dual functions is termed self 
duality, The linear logar ithmic fun ction is the o nly self dual translog func-
tion. 
14see Bernd t and Christiansen ( 1974) for more detail on these cond itio ns. 
We have im posed w hat is called linear se parabilit y o f pro perty crim e sol-
utions from o ther activities which implies InC (Y, w) = InC 1 (Y 1 , y 2 , ... 
Y p' w) + I nC2 (y p+l , Y p+ 2 . .. , y n ' w) w here 1 nC 1 and 1 nC2 are tra ns-' 
log fu nctions (See Blackorby, Primont a nd Russell (1974). Functiona l 
separability may also be ach ieved via a set of nonlinear rest rictions(see 
Berndt and Chris tiansen {1 974).) Blackorby, Pri mont and Russell ( 1 974) 
have shown t hat nonlinear separabili ty implies I nC (Y, w) = F (O 1 (Y 1, 
Y 2' .. ·, Y p' w), 0 2 (y p' Y p+1' ... , y n' w)}where D 1 a nd 0 2 are li,near log-
arithmic func tions. 
Linear logarithmic "aggregator" functions are q uite restrictive and for 
th~ reaso n we consider o nly the case of linear separability througho ut 
thts paper. 37 
for this study information on annual police bud gets for the 
years 1968, 1969, 197 1 and 1973 for a sample of approximately 
thirty five medium size cities; the average wages of officers by 
rank, the number of crimes of type i cleared by arrest 
("clearances") and the average value s tolen for each of the 
proper ty crimes in the FBI index.15 The police budget and 
wage information was gathered by the Kansas City Police 
Department and circula ted for use by participating cities under 
the title of the Annual General Administrative Survey. The 
data on clearances and average values stolen is from unpublished 
sources at the FBI . Because of limitations on the number of 
variables which could ultimately be allowed in the model, we 
decided to use clearances by arrest for the seven FBI index 
crimes as our measures of "solutions." In par ticular, we have 
called burglary clearances (solutions), y 1, robbery clearances, 
y2 , motor vehicle theft clearances y3, and larceny clearances, 
y 4. We have used the aggregate number of homicide, rape and 
assault clearances to represent solutions to crimes against the 
person and have labeled t his output , y 5. Finally, a very large 
component of the output of all law enforcement agencies are 
the rather mundane but important service fu.nc tions: Directing 
traffic, investigating accidents, breaking up fights, providing 
emergen cy first aid , etc. We group all such service functions 
together as y 6. The question is wha t to use to measure these 
activ it ies. We have ad opted the hypothesis that the quant ity 
of services of the type we have been discussing is proportional 
to the size of the city in which the agen cy is located . This 
gives a cost function with six outputs and a s till unspecified 
number of input prices. 
We had available wage information on e igh t grades of police 
officers from pat rolman to chief. As one might expect these 
wage rises are highly collinear. To test for the existence of a 
Hicksian price index we computed correlation coefficients 
between the wages of the various ranks and found very high 
coefficients. For example, the correlation between wages of 
patrolmen and a weighted average of the wages of all o ther 
ranks is .955. Unfortuna tely , t here does not appear to be a way 
of testing whe ther a sample correlation is sign ificantly d ifferent 
from one since the distribution of this statistic is degenerate at 
tha t point. But with correlations this high it appears safe to 
assume the cond itions for Hicks' aggrega tion are fulfilled 
and hence we use a weighted average of all police wages as 
an aggregate measure of unit labor costs, deno ted w.l6 
The translog cos t function of (2) above may now be written 
as 
15fhe largest city in o ur sa mple is Ho usto n , Texas, ( I ,230,000), the sma ll-
est is Birmingham, Alabama (300,000) . Mean population over the sample 
is 56 1,000. 
16Budget and w age series have been deflated using an index based upon 
BLS Intermed iate Family Budget data. (See B.L.S. Bu lletins No. I 570-7 
and the Monthly Labor Review. ) 
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TABLE I 
Parameter Restrictions for Linear Functional Separability 19 
-Aggregate Pa ra meter Restrictions Aggregate Parameter Restrictions 
-
(yl , Y2) a = a = a = a = 1'1 = 1'2 =0 (y 1 ,y2,y3) a = a = a = 1'1 = 1'2 = 'Y == o 13 14 23 24 14 24 34 3 
(y1 , y3) a = a = a = a = 1'1 = 1'3 =0 CY t ,y2,y4) a = a = a = 'Yl = 1'2 = 'Y ::::0 12 14 23 34 13 23 34 4 
(yl , Y4) a =a = a = a = 
'Yl = 1'4 =0 (yl ,y3,y 4) a = a = a = 1'1 = 1'3 = 'Y == o 12 13 24 34 12 23 24 4 
(Y2, y3) a =a = a = a = 1'2 = 1'3 = 0 (y2,y3,y4) a = a = a = 1'2 = 1'3 = 'Y ==o 12 24 13 34 12 13 14 4 
(y2, y 4) a = a = a = a = 1'2 = 1'4 = 0 (y 1 ,y2,Y3 ,Y 4) 1'1 = 1'2 = 1'3 = 1'4 = 12 23 14 34 0 
(y3, y 4) a =a = a = a = 1'3 = 1'4 = 0 13 23 14 24 
l 9These restr ict ions are cond itiona l on the fu nc tional separability o f pro pert y cri me so lutions and all o t her po lice act ivities. 
TABLE II 
Parameter Estimates for Five Cost Models 
Unrestricted Homogeneity Homo. and Homo. a nd Constant Returns 
Para meter Mode l in Input Prices Nonjo in t Outputs Linear Log. Costs to Scale 
ao - 108.68 - 98.899 -75.949 - 4.469 - .7190 (27.23) (7.5 12) (2.190) (1.092) (1.332) 
a1 - .0049 - .0542 - .1 326 .0292 .0053 
(.0478) (.0168) (.0127) (.0016) (.0 1 14) 
a2 .0244 .0203 .0 129 .0065 .0314 
(.011 8) (.0 11 0) (.0108) (.0003) (.0 109) 
a3 .3262 .2989 .2378 .0459 .3956 (.0679) (.0615) (.0603) (.0026) (.0646) 
a4 .0252 .003 1 - .0467 .01 98 .0378 
(.0293) (.0205) (.0203) ( .0009) ( .0 190) 
as 1.657 - 2. 118 - .4037 .2448 .4127 
( 1.682) (1.084) (.4853) ( .0376) ( .4088) 
a6 16 .01 6 16.38 12.259 .91 13 .1 170 
(.591 7) (.6349) (.1848) (.0902) (.4147) 
b .7123 
(7.393) 
a ll .01 27 .J199 .0296 .0206 (.0020) (.059 1) ( .0561) (.00 14) 
a 22 .0033 .0034 .0032 .0032 (.0005) (.0005) ( .0003) (.0005) 
a33 .0287 .0284 .0294 .0 189 (.0022) (.0022) (.0019) (.0019) 
a44 .01 25 .01 25 .0 119 .0115 (.0009) (.0009) ( .0009) (.0007) 
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Unrestricted Homogeneity Homo. and Homo. and Constant Returns 
Parameter Model in Input Prices Nonjoint Outputs Linear Log. Costs · to Sca le 
ass 
.0448 .0177 .OS04 .0209 
(.OS28) (.OS24) (.0441) (.0621) 
a66 - l.4S1 - 1.2711 - .OOOS .0209 (*) (*) (*) (.0621) 
a12 - .0022 - .0023 - .0277 (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) 
a13 - .0049 - .OOS1 - .011S (.0016) (.0017) (.001S) 
a 14 - .OOS3 - .OOSS - .0063 (.0010) (.001 0) (.0008) 
a23 - .0002 - .0002 - .0013 (.OOOS) (.OOOS) (.0005) 
a24 .0013 .0013 
.0008 
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) 
~4 - .0022 - .0022 - .0061 (.0010) (.0010) (.0008) 
aS6 .0996 .1097 - .0209 (.0882) (.0884) (.0621) 
~ - .1471 
(.5356) 
1'1 - .0082 - .0963 .0017 (.0071) (.0590) (.001S) 
1'2 - .0048 - .0041 - .0039 - .0034 
(.0017) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) 
1'3 - .0617 - .0571 - .OS74 - .0496 (.0100) (.0090) (.0088) (.0097) 
1'4 - .0087 - .OOSO - .0041 - .0041 (.0043) (.0028) (.0029) (.0068) 
~'5 - ;4615 .1029 .0286 - .0068 (.1809) (.OS86) (.0562) (.0231) 
~'6 .4798 .0598 .044S .0622 (*) (.0236) (.0236) (.025S) 
*Co !linearity problems prevented estimatio n of t his standard error. 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT AGGREGATES 
Parameter (1 , 2, 3) (1, 2, 4) (1 , 3, 4) (2,3. 4) (1. 2. 3, 4) 
0:23 .0005 - .0005 - .0003 (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) 
0:24 .0013 .0010 .0013 (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) 
0:34 - .0028 - .0021 - .0029 (.0010) (.0009) (.0010) 
0:56 .0802 .0932 .1222 .1 245 .1032 (.0870) (.0881) (.0984) (.0881) (.0889) 
{3 
'Y1 
'Y2 - .0003 (.001 5) 




- .4038 - .4184 -.4522 .0336 - .4546 5 (.1939) (.J 969) (.1984) ( .0570) (.1989) 
'Y6 .1873 .2501 .2186 - .0327 .2192 (.0992) (.1011) (.0105) (.0190) (.1017) 
*Collinearity problems prevented estimates of this s tandard error. 
TABLE V 
Marginal Costs of Outputs, Rates of Transformation between 
urpu san eturns to ca e at samp: e means ' 0 t t d R S I ( I )~ 
€ 1.069 MC5 2448.00 MRT24 .607 (.0817) 
€ .3429 MRT12 .191 MRT25 10.77 (.0571) 
MC 1 11 86.87 MRT13 .992 MRT34 .117 (543.35) 
MC2 227.24 MRT14 .116 MRT35 2.08 (11.04) 
MC3 1177.18 MRT15 2.06 MRT45 17.74 (45.51) 
MC4 138.01 MRT23 5.1 8 (5 .81) 
*Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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where a: 15 = a: 16 = o:25 = o:26 = 0:35 = o:36 = 0:45 = o:46 = 0 
due to the imposed functional separability of property cr ime 
solutions and all other police activities. 
Linear homogenity of C* in w imposes the fu rther restric-
tions 
6 
(18) b=l, 13=0, L-y-=0 1 I 
while constant returns to scale imply 
6 6 6 6 
(19) Lai = I , ~ o:ij = ~ o:ij = 0, v i, j and L
1 
-y i = 0 . 
1 1 J 
If property crime solutions are non joint then 
(20) o:ij = 0 • i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, i * j 
The latter imposes only six additional restrictions, since dif-
ferentiabil ity of 1 nC* implies symmetry of the o:ij. 
Finally, given the hypothesis of functional separability 
between property crime solutions and all other police activities 
there are a total of eleven possible groupings of property crime 
solutions which might be considered for indexing. Our question 
here is not whether an index exists in any of these cases because 
an index can always be found, but whether a consistent index 
exists. J 7 The eleven candidates for aggregat ion and indexing 
are displayed in Table I along with the implied linear separability 
restrictions. 18 It is important to keep in mind that the existence 
of an aggregate (a functionally separate group) does not in 
general imply existence of a consistent index for the aggregate. 
(See Theorem 4). 
For the case at hand, system (11) may be written as 
l 7 An example of such a question is whether it is possible to aggregate 
burglary, robbery and larcen y solut io ns into a co mposite category su ch as 
"non au tomobile theft" solutions. Given the nu mbers of burglary, rob-
bery and larceny solutions a nd their impu ted values, how does one derive 
quantity and value ind ices fo r "non auto mobile theft" solutions? Su p-
pose burglar y solu t ions, robbery solutions and larceny solutions are sep-
arable from other police ou tputs and input prices, then the cost function 
~ay be written as C(y, w) = C(c 1(y 1, y2 , y4}, y 3, y5, y6, w). In addi-
hon, if c 1 is homothetic then y 1, y 2 and y 4 may be aggregated into a 
category. The quantity index for sample pointy* :=(y•, y•, y*) is de-
t 
. I 2 4 
. ermmed by the function c 1 (·) and th:_ values of (y i, y i• y 4>· Since t he 
mdex shou ld be linear homogenous in y, the problem is to find an ag-
gregator function for¢ (c1 (y )} which is lin ear homogeneous in y. The 
· quantity (solu tio n) in~ex is_ then ¢ (c 1 (y*)) at y*. T he correspond ing 
value (price) index is P* = (Piyi + PiYi + P4y4) 1¢ (c1 (y*)}. Eva luat-
tng two "non automobile theft" solution vec tors (y•1, y*, y*), and (y
0
, 
o o - - o 2 4 1 
Y 2• Y 4J, given r • and P , but without knowledge of t he function c (·}, 
is th e analog to the more traditional index problem. 
1 
18As was pointed out in footnote 14 above, there are also sets of nonlinear 
restrictions which lead to functiona l separab ility. The implica tions of 
these conditions are so res tr ic t ive that more nonlinear separabi lity is not 
considered in the tests repor ted below. 
41 
6 
(2 1) Piy/C* = ai + LO:iJ·lnyJ. +-y. I nw, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 1 I 
where a: ij = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, j = 5, 6 and a: ij = o:ji• \Li , j. (The 
fust four equations here given the value to society of Y· 
1 . I so utwns to property crime i as a proportion of total police 
expenditures.) The next step in implementing the econometric 
version of the model is to provide a stochastic framework for 
equations (21). We do this by appending classical additive dis-
disturbances arise either as a result of random error in the 
maximizing behavior of police administrators, or as a result of 
the fact that the translog function provides only an approxi-
mation of the "true" underlying production structure. We 
assume that noncontemporaneous disturbances are uncor-
relatcd both within and across equations. We make no other 
assumptions about the distribution of disturbances other than 
they be uncorrelated with right hand variables in each equa-
tion.20 
EMPIRICA L RESULTS 
We have fitted the five equations of system (21) under the 
stochastic specification outlined above. There were 125 obser-
vations available for estimating each equation in the system so 
that the total number of degrees of freedom for statistical tests 
is 625. Since no assumption has been made concerning the 
distribution of disturbances, our estimation procedure may 
be thought of as multiequation , nonlinear least squares. In the 
computations we used the Gauss-Newton method to locate 
minima. The results of estimation are presented in Table II. 
The estimates reported in column two contain no restric-
tions other than the symmetry implied by the continuous dif-
ferentiability of 1nC* and entails estimating twenty-eight para-
meters. Given the primarily cross section nature of the data, the 
model fits quite well with R2 figures of .74 for the cost func-
tion and .36, .13, .46, and .29 for the value of solution equa-
tions Piy/C*, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively. Durbin-Watson statis-
tics are 1.8 1, 1.94, 2.41, 2.53, and 2.18, respectively. It appears 
that disturbances associated with each equation are serially 
independent)! 
In column three, we report estimates of the model with 
homogeneity in input prices imposed. As w,e have noted pre-
viously, cost minimizing input decis ions imply a production 
cost function with this property and for this reason we may 
consider a test of the fit of the homogeneous model as a test 
of the consistency of the data with cost minimizing behavior. 
20The latt er is in fact a rather stro ng assumption. It may be eliminated 
by using a set of instrumental variab les to generate "predicted" values of 
y i' say 9i' and then rep lacing yi w ith 9i when estimating system (2 1 ). 
This approach will be reported on in a later version of this paper. 
2 ! James Durbin has argued that the conven tional sing le equation Durbin-
Watson s tatistic be used to check for serial corre lat io n in sim u lt aneous 
equation systems. 
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Homogeneity in prices reduces the number of parameters 
to be estimated from twenty-eight to twenty-five (see equa-
tion (18) ). Traditional R 2 statistics are . 72 for the cost equa-
tion and .35, .12, .46 and .28 respectively for the value share 
equations. Durbin-Watson statistics for the five equations are 
1.75, 1.94, 2.41, 2.5I and 2.2I, respectively. With the possible 
exception of the cost equation, it again appears that disbur-
bances are serially independent. 
In columns four, five and six are reported parameter estimates 
for the case of nonjoint outputs, linear logarithmic costs and 
constant returns to scale, each conditional on linear homogen-
eity in input prices. In column four are the estimates with 
input price homogeneity and nonjointness of output imposed. 
These restrictions reduce the number of parameters to eigh-
teen. The linear logarithmic cost function (column five) was 
estimated primarily to contrast· the functional form of the 
cost function presented in this paper with that implied by the 
linear logarithmic production functions which have been esti-
mated in the maiority of earlier papers.22 The total number of 
parameters to be estimated is now reduced to seven. The final 
column contains our estimate of the model with constant re-
turns to scale imposed. 
Our tests of the various hypotheses which have been dis-
cussed are based upon the test statistic 
(22) n = max LR/max L R 
where max LR is the maximum value of the likelihood funct ion 
for the model with restrictions Rand max L R is the maximum 
value of the likelihood function without restriction . Minus 
twice the logarithm of n is asymptotically distributed as chi-
squared with number of degrees of freedom equal to the num-
ber of restrictions imposed . Throughout we choose critical 
regions based upon the .OI level of significance. 
Logarithms of the likelihood function are given in Table III 
for each of the model specifications to be evaluated. We first 
test the hypothesis that police agencies make cho ices in a cost 
minimizing manner, which imJ?lies C* is linearly homogeneous 
in w. Comparing the homogeneous model with the unrestric ted 
model we find that minus twice the logarithm o f the likelihood 
ratio is 4.52. Since there are but three restrictions imposed, we 
easily accept the hypothesis of a cost structure which is 
linearly homogeneous in input prices. That is, the data in 
our sample of police departments are cons istent with cost 
minimizing behavior. 
Conditional on linear homogeneity in input prices we next 
test the validity of the hypothesis of non joint outputs- a hypo-
thesis which has been maintained in past studies whenever single 
output aggregates have not been utilized. Minus twice the 
logarithm of the likelihood ratio is 53 .08 and the nonjoint-
ness hypothesis is resoundingly rejected. We conclude that one 
may not go about estimating separate production functions or 
separate cost functions for each of the outputs of police 
agencies. The interaction between outputs must be accounted 
for if one is to adequately characterize the structure of cost 
and produc tion in this "industry." 
22 Recall that a linear logarithmic production funct io n is self dual and 
hence implies a cost function of the same functional form. 
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TABLE III 
Estimated Values of Ln of Likelihood Function 
Mod el Functional Separability Imposed 
Unrestricted 1654.57 {1, 2) 1628.94 (1, 2, 3) 1616.43 
Homogeneous in 
Input Prices 1652.31 (1, 3) 1613.50 (1, 2, 4) 1645.79 
Homog. in Input 
Prices and 
Nonjoint 1625.77 (1, 4) 1640.13 (1, 3, 4) 1628.40 
Linear Logarith-
mic Costs 1483.57 (2,4) 1627.16 (1, 2, 3, 4) 1636.79 
Homog. in Input 
Prices and 
Output 1613.23 (2, 3) 1619.70 (2,3,4) 1612.56 
h (yl' y2, y4) is 
homo the tic 1628.52 (3, 4) 1611.56 
It is instructive to contrast the linear logarithmic cost and 
production structure implied by these data, with our more 
general model. Columns three and five of Table II contain 
parameter estimates for the cost models which maintain homo-
geneity in prices, and a linear logarithmic production structure . 
in addition to linear homogeneity in prices.23 The fac t that 
twice the logarithm of the likelihood ratio for this test is 
337.48 is a fairly accurate indication of the magnitude of the 
loss in explanatory power resulting from adopting the Cobb-
Douglas functional form fo r C*. 
Parameter estimates for the models associated with each of 
the eleven possible output aggregates are presented in Table IV 
with corresponding logarithms o f likelihood funct ions tabulated 
in the right-hand columns of Table Ti l. Since we have accepted 
the hypothesis of linear homogene ity in input prices, we test 
these restr ictions conditional on the validity of this hypothesis. 
To begin we choose the prospective aggregate (y 1, y2 , Y 4) 
with the largest likelihood function. Minus twice the logarithm 
of the likelihood ratio is 13.04 in this case. Since there are a 
total of six additional restrictions the chi-square (.01) critical 
value is J 6.18 and functional separability of burglary, robbery 
and larceny solutions from the remaining outputs and from 
input prices is accepted. Perusal of Table lll indicates tha t all 
other potential aggregates are rejected and hence, say, h(y1, 
y2 , y 4) is the only category function. 
According to Theorem 4, if either the cost fu nction is 
homothet ic or if C* is not homothetic, but the category 
function for (y I, y2 , y 4) is homo the tic, then a consistent 
aggregate index of burglary, robbery and larceny exists. Barring 
each of these cases another possibility for consistent aggregation 
remains; the values for y 1, y2 andy 4 (PI , P2, P 4) (or for that 
matter, the values of any subgroup of (y 1, y2 , y3, y4) are 
perfectly correlated. (See Hicks' Aggregation Theorem above). 
To begin these tests we have calculated returns to scale at the 
mean of (y I , y2 , y3 , y 4 , y 5, y 6,w) and the standard error of this 
statis tic and find we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale. (See Table V below.) The fact that C* is 
2 3of co urse, linear logarith mic cost and production functions main· 
tain the nonjo intness hypothesis. 
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TABLE IV 
Parameter Estimates: Linear Homogeneity in Input Prices and Functional Separability Imposed 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT AGGREGATES 
Parameter (2, 3) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1 , 2) (2, 4) (3, 4) 
ao 
- 95 .5161 - 95.75 - 106.47 - 101.42 - 98.5637 - 89.6617 
(33.8291) (33.53) (7.280) (7.212) (33.4918) (7.4351) 
a1 -.073 1 - .1348 - .0683 - .1199 - .1 325 - .1228 (.0173) (.0129) (.0171) (.0137) (.0131) (.0138) 
a2 - .0090 - .0148 .0113 - .0066 - .0150 - .0078 (.0027) (.0101) (.0103) (.0033) (.0037) (.0097) 
a3 -.1 259 - .1306 .2494 .2059 .1887 - .1265 (.0158) (.1 075) (.0581) (.OS68) (.OS66) (.0168) 
a4 -.0526 - .0892 - .0368 -.OS06 - .07S3 - .06S9 (.1867) (.OI9S) (.0099) (.01 92) (.0083) (.0078) 
as -2.1855 - 1.84S 1.237 1.320 -1.8340 - 1.8721 (1.2147) (1.187) (1.761) (1.741) (1.2022) (1.0716) 
a6 16.4742 16.47 15.976 1S .31 16.5406 IS.4808 (S.3143) (S.277) ( .8S3S) (.8442) (S .2618) (.6226) 
b 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
all .0621 .0278 .0187 .0209 .0327 .0491 (.OS87) (.0077) (.0017) (.00 18) (.OS84) (.OS74) 
~2 .0029 .0030 .0028 .0033 .0028 .0036 (.0004) (.0004) (.OOOS) (.0004) (.0004) (.OOOS) 
~3 .0268 .0321 .026S .0283 .0309 .0289 (.0023) (.0023) (.0021) (.0020) (.0021) (.0023) 
a44 .0124 .011 9 .0122 .0123 .1174 .0126 (.0009) (.0094) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.001 0) 
ass .0177 .0321 .0393 .0454 .0282 .026S (.0527) (.0521) (.0523) (.0516) (.OOS2) (.OS18) 
a66 - 1.247 - 1.238 -1.348 - 1.280 - 1.2747 - 1.1S82 (.4224) (.4201) (*) (*) (.4182) (*) 
a12 -.0010 - .0010 (.0005) (.0006) 
al3 - .0043 - .003S (.0016) (.0015) 
Ql4 -.OOSO - .0052 (.0010) (.0009) 
Q23 -.0004 - .0003 
(.0005) (.OOOS) 
Q24 .0006 .ooos (.0004) (.0004) 
Q34 -.001 9 - .0020 (.0008) (.0009) 
Q56 .1320 .1147 .1120 .0941 .1183 .1084 
(.0995) (.0982) (.0880) (.0871) ( .0984) (.0876) 
~ 
~'1 
· *Collinear ity problems prevented estima tes of this st andard error. 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
POTENTIAL OUTPUT AGG RE GATES 
Parameter (2. 3 ) (1 , 3) (1, 4 ) (1, 2) (2, 4 ) (3, 4) 
'Y2 - .0003 - .0030 - .00001 (.OOIS) (.001S) (.OO IS) 
'Y3 - .OS60 - .0493 - .047S (.008S) (.0083) (.0082) 
'Y4 .0019 .0018 - .0020 (.002S) (.0029) (.0027) 
rs .0678 .0362 -.4201 - .4043 .0320 .OS81 (.OS8S) (.026S) (.1966) (.1942) (.OS79) (.OS73) 
'Y6 - .0266 - .03S8 .263S .2429 .0233 - .030S (.0192) (.0226) (.1009) (.0997) (.0213) (.0194) 
POTE NTIA L OUTPUT AGGR~GATES 
Para meter (1 , 2, 3 ) (1 , 2, 4) (1, 3, 4 ) (2.-3 . 4 ) (1, 2. 3, 4) 
ao -102.00 - 114.68 - .113 .77 - 100.124 - 121.61 
(7.208) (7 .306) (32.S7) (7.4896) (7.372) 
a1 - .1276 - .06S6 - .0673 - .13 11 - .0612 
(.01 22) (.0169) (.0163) ( .0141) (.016S) 
a2 - .0097 - .0082 - .0064 - .0169 - .0070 
(.0032) ( .0039) (.0094) (.0037) (.0040) 
a3 - .1233 .212 1 - .0811 - .1317 - .0736 (.0166) (.OS62) (.0204) (.017S) (.0213) 
a4 ~.0827 -.0368 - .03S9 - .0744 - .0331 
(.0186) (.0100) (.009S) (.0083) (.0100) 
as 1.444 1.4S2 1.29S - 1.91S7 l.S46 
(1.739) (L76S) (1.848) (1.0807) (1.782) 
a6 1S.74 17.199 17.40 17.1S49 18.438 (.8408) (.8SS 1) (S.l49) (.6260) (.8603) 
b 1 
all .0262 .0210 .0229 .022S .0246 (.0021) (.00 17) (.0020) (.OS71) (.0020) 
a22 .0034 .0032 .0024 .0030 .0034 (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.OOOS) 
a33 .0311 .0261 .0299 .0304 .0294 (.0023) (.0021) (.0024) (.0023) (.0024) 
a44 .0114 .0121 .0126 .0130 .0127 (.0009) (.0008) (.0009) (.0010) (.0009) 
ass .OS32 .0431 .0446 .0267 .0477 (.OS16) (.OS23) (.OS27) (.OS23) (.OS28) 
a66 - 1.278 - 1.426 - 1.436 - 1.29SO - 1.504 (*) (*) (.409S) (*) (*) 
a12 -.001 1 - .0021 - .0021 (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) 
al3 - .0048 - .0066 
- .0064 (.001S) (.001 7) (.0017) 
a14 - .0062 - .0039 - .0048 
(.0010) (.001 0) (.0010) 
*Co llincarity pro ble ms prevented est imates of this standard error. 
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linearly homogeneous in outputs at the sample means certainly 
does not imply constant returns to scale throughout the 
relevant output region (and consequently a homothetic cost 
function), but does suggest that it is of interest to test this 
hypothesis. The logarithm of the likelihood function associa ted 
with this model (linear homogeneity in input prices and 
outputs) is reported in Table llJ. According to equation ( 19) 
above, linear homogeneity in outputs imposes seven additional 
restrictions on the mode[.24 The value of the test statistics 
is 78. 16 and hence these data lend no support whatever to 
the constant returns hypothesis. 
We next reestimated the model for the case when h (y 1, y2, 
y 4J is constained to be homo the tic, maintaining the hypotheses 
of linear homogeneity in prices and functional separability of 
(y 1, y 2, y 4). This imposes llu-ce add itional restrictions on the 
model, all= --a-12 - al4• a22 = - a12 -~4anda44 = - a14 
-a24. The value of the log likelihood function is reported 
in the last, left hand row or Table lH and yields a test statistic 
of 35.54 which leads to reje ction of the homotheticity hypo-
thesis.25 We conclude that although an aggregator function, h 
O. exists for (y 1, y2, y 4) , a consistent index, via homothetic 
separability, cannot be found.26 
Finally, we have calculated the correlation matrix for P to 
check for the possibility of a Hicksian aggregate. The correla-
tions are r 12 = .065, r13 = .065, r14 = .901 , r23 = .197, r24 = 
.014 and r34 = 0.026. Of course,such calculations permit testing 
only pairwise groupings of outputs in the first step. It is 
interesting to note that the only highly correlated val ues (P1 
and P4) are associated with the outputs (y 1, y4) which in 
turn have the smallest test statistic among all pairs in our 
tests of functional separability. (See Table Il l.) Although 
rr4= .901 is far from a perfect correlation and the functional 
separability of (y 1, y 4) was rejected above, both the size of 
the correlation coefficient and the size of the tes t statistic 
suggest that burglary solutions and larceny solutions may in 
some situations be consistently aggregated. 
MARGINAL COSTS, RATES OF TRANSFORMATION 
AND RETURNS TO SCALE 
The marginal cost fu nction for activity i is given by 3C*/3yi 
= (31nC*/3lnyi) (C*/yi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and may be calculat-
ed using the formula 
(23) 3C*/3yi = (ai + ~ai}nYj +f'ilnw) (e1nC*/yi), i = 1, 2, ... , 5 
I 
As indicated, (23) will be valid for each of the crime solving 
outputs, y 1, y2, ... , y5 and not for y6. Recall that the sixth 
24Sy m metry of the a .. reduces the restrictions in (19) from thirteen to 
seven. Recail that Lf'i ~ 0 .is already imposed. 
25A necessary and sufficient cond ition for homotheticity of the trans· 
log function h(y 1, y 2, y 4 ) (see footnote 14) is that h O be homogeneous, 
wh ich implies the conditions g ive n. 
26We have tested thr ee in creasingly special cases of the cost model in this 
seq uence of tests, (homogeneity in input pr ices, fu nctional separab ilit y of 
(y 1• Y 2, Y 4) from other outputs and w, give n ho mogeneity in input prices 
and homo thet icity of h (Y 1, y 2 , y 4) given· ho mogeneit y in in put prices 
and functional separability of (y 1, y 2, y 4) ). T he overa U level o f sign ifi-
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output was an aggregate of tl1e "non-crime solving" services pro-
vided by police. Since we have postulated only that the produc-
tion of this output is proportional to population size, it will 
be possible to determine 3C*/3y6 only up to this factor of 
proportionality. 
The rate of transformation of output i for output j gives 
the number of solutions to crimes of type i which must be for-
gone for an additional solution to a crime of type j, given fixed 
levels of all other outputs. Formally , the rate of transformation 
betwe:nout~u~s-iand j may ~e v.:ritten as -3yj/3Yj =@C*/3_yj) 
I ( ac /3yi), t,J- 1, 2, ... , 5, 1 =I= J, and may be calculated usmg 
the formula 
(24) - ,i, j = 1,2, ... ,5, i =t= j 
As with marginal cost functions, it will not be possible to obtain 
transformation rates between outpu t six and other ou tputs. 
Traditional measures of scale economies (or diseconomies) 
are predicated on the single output firm and must be modified 
for use here. We measure scale economies as the percentage 
response of costs to a small equal percentage change in all out-
puts. That is, 
6 
(25) e = dC*/C* = L(a I nC*/3 1ny) (dq/q) , 
1 
where dq/q is the percentage change in outputs.27 Of course 
one may calculate e for subsets of outputs holding the remain-
ing outputs fixed. Here we report on two scale measures, e and 
E. The former measures the percentage responses of c.osts to an 
equal percentage change in all solutions and in the service out-
put , y 6.
28 The latter concept will measure the percentage res-
ponse of costs to a change only in crime solving activities and is 
calculated according to the formula 
5 
(26) e = L (31nC*/a i nyi) (dq/q), 
Marginal cost functions (MCi), rates of transformation 
(MRTij) and returns to scale functions (€and e) evalua ted at 
sample means are presented in Table V. To aid in evaluating 
these· figures we have calculated standard errors (in paren-
(thesis) for the two scale measures and each or the marginal 
costs. Since MC 1 is the only marginally significant, one should 
not put too much faith in the computed marginal cost of 
burglary solutions and the rates of transformation which 
depend upon it. All other statistics are highly significant. Also, 
because these functions are h ighly nonlinear one must take 
care in intepreting the values in the table. 
cance for such co-caUed " nested" tests is approx imately the su m of signi-
ficance levels for individual tests in the sequence. 
-
27 E.G., if dqfq = I, and ~:< tat y*, the n the production funct ion ex hibits 
increas ing returns to scale at the o utput m ix y*, etc. 
28The proportionality between population size and y 6 causes no pro blem 







Figure ! - Marginal Cost Function for Activity 4. 
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Figure 2 - Returns to Scale over Crime Solving Activities. 
Figure 3- Returns to Scale over All Activities 
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€ linear logarithmic costs 
dq/q 
e linear logarithmic costs 
Jq/q 
-
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At the sample means equal percentage changes in all out-
puts lead to approximately equal percentage changes in cost; 
while costs are much less responsive when only crime solving 
outputs are varied, holding services, y 6, constant. According to 
our estimates, incremental costs for clearing larcenies are the 
lowest ($138.01), followed by robbery ($227.24), motor ve-
hicle thefts ($1 177. 18) and crimes against the person ($2448.-
00). As we have noted, each of these estimates is highly 
significant. 
Rates of transformation between outputs at sample means 
range from .11 7 between motor vehicle theft solutions and 
larceny solutions to almost eighteen between larceny solutions 
and solutions to crimes against the person. Hence, the estimated 
cost function predicts that on average it will be necessary to 
forego between eight and nine larceny solutions to solve 
one additional motor vehicle theft (at the mean) and approxi-
mately eigh teen larceny solu tions to solve the "average" crime 
against the person. Similar interpretations hold for the other 
transformation rates. 
Figures 1-3 indicate the general curvature of the estimated 
marginal functions and re turns to scale functions.29 Tn figures 
2 and 3 we have for contrast included plots of the scale 
measures ( EQ and €Q) associated with a linear logarithmic pro-
duction structure. Of course in this case these functions are 
constant and are .346 and 1.258, respectively. The marginal 
cost function for output i has been graphed by evaluating (23) 
at (Y1' y2, . . . , Yi· ... , Y6, w), where the over bar indicates 
sample means, and allowing Yi to vary over the sample. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have adopted the economic model of an 
optimizing fi rm as a framework for characterizing the produc-
tion structure of a sample of medium sized U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies. Unlike previous studies we have begun with a 
second order approximation to an arbitrary multi-output-
multi-input production possibilities function. This rather gen-
eral functional specification has permitted us to test a number 
of hypotheses which have been implicitly maintained in earlier 
work. Of particular interes t is the finding that at least in our 
sample, the decisions of police administrators are consisten t 
with cost minimization and th at outputs are very defin itely 
joint- thereby effectively precluding estimation of separate 
production and/or cost functions for the different outputs of 
police agencies. ln addition we strongly rejected the hypothesis 
of constant returns to scale and indeed found that scale econo-
mies varied considerably with activity levels. Finally, our sam-
ple contained no evidence suppor ting the existence of a con-
sistent index by which certain subse ts of property crime solu-
tions could be aggregated. 
29E was ca lculated hy evaluating equatio n (25) at (min y (1 + o)i, w) for 
~ <8 < I and i > 0. Also i was chosen so that m in y (I + o) < max y. 
1 he analogous procedure was used to graph €. Here w re presen ts the sam-
ple mean o f w. 
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